Abstract. We develop an abstract framework that encompasses the key properties of bilinear groups of composite order that are required to construct secure pairing-based cryptosystems, and we show how to use prime-order elliptic curve groups to construct bilinear groups with the same properties. In particular, we define a generalized version of the subgroup decision problem and give explicit constructions of bilinear groups in which the generalized subgroup decision assumption follows from the decision DiffieHellman assumption, the decision linear assumption, and/or related assumptions in prime-order groups.
Introduction
Bilinear groups of composite order are a tool that has been used in the last few years to solve many problems in cryptography. The concept was introduced by Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [6] , who applied the technique to the problems of private information retrieval, online voting, and universally verifiable computation. Subsequent authors have built on their work to create protocols such as non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [19, 20] , ring and group signatures [10, 31] , attribute-based encryption [8, 23] , traitor tracing schemes [7] , and hierarchical identity-based encryption [24, 33] .
Bilinear groups of composite order are pairs of abelian groups (G, G t ), each of composite order n = pq, equipped with a nondegenerate bilinear map e : G × G → G t . At their core, cryptosystems using bilinear groups of composite order usually base their security on variants of the subgroup decision assumption. Informally, this assumption says that given an element g ∈ G, there is no efficient algorithm to determine whether g has order p. In particular, this assumption implies that it is infeasible to factor the group order n.
While the subgroup decision assumption is a useful tool for constructing secure protocols, it presents significant obstacles to implementing these protocols in practice. The only known instantiations of composite-order bilinear groups use elliptic curves (or more generally, abelian varieties) over finite fields. Since the elliptic curve group order n must be infeasible to factor, it must be at least (say) 1024 bits. On the other hand, the size of a prime-order elliptic curve group that provides an equivalent level of security is 160 bits [2] . As a result, group operations and especially pairing computations are prohibitively slow on composite-order curves: a Tate pairing on a 1024-bit composite-order elliptic curve is roughly 50 times slower than the same pairing on a comparable prime-order curve [29] , and this performance gap will only get worse at higher security levels.
In short, requiring that the group order be infeasible to factor negates the principal advantage of elliptic curve cryptography over factoring-based systems, namely, that there is no known subexponental-time algorithm for computing discrete logarithms on an elliptic curve, while there is such an algorithm for factoring. Thus for efficient implementations we seek versions of protocols that use only prime-order elliptic curve groups. Developing these protocols is the main goal of this paper. In particular, we do the following:
• We develop an abstract framework that encompasses the key properties of bilinear groups of composite order, and we show how to use prime-order elliptic curves to construct bilinear groups with the same properties.
• We apply our framework and our prime-order construction to create more efficient versions of cryptosystems that originally used composite-order groups. Specifically, we consider: 1. The Boneh-Goh-Nissim encryption scheme [6] , 2. The Boneh-Sahai-Waters traitor tracing system [7] , and 3. The Katz-Sahai-Waters attribute-based encryption scheme [23] .
Our conversion of the last two systems to prime-order groups answers a problem posed by Groth and Sahai [20, Section 9] , 1 who themselves implicitly use our framework to construct non-interactive proof systems using either composite-order or prime-order groups.
Outline and Summary of Results. The starting point for our abstract framework is the fact that the subgroup decision assumption defined by Boneh, Goh, and Nissim depends only on the existence of a group G for which it is infeasible to determine if an element g ∈ G lies in a given
proper subgroup G 1 of G. This observation gives us a more general subgroup decision assumption in the language of abstract groups; see Section 2 for details. Our construction using prime-order groups is based on the observation, used implicitly by Cramer and Shoup [13] and articulated explicitly by Gjøsteen [18] , that the decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption is a generalized subgroup decision assumption. Specifically, suppose we are given a cyclic group G and elements g, g a , g b , g c ∈ G. Then the DDH assumption for G says exactly that it is infeasible to determine whether (g b , g c ) is in the cyclic subgroup of G × G generated by (g, g a ).
Thus any protocol that requires two groups G 1 ⊂ G in which the generalized subgroup decision assumption holds can be instantiated using G = G × G and G 1 = (g 1 , g 2 ) , where G is a cyclic group in which the DDH assumption holds and g 1 , g 2 are random elements of G.
More generally, we can use G = G n for any n ≥ 2 and let G 1 be a rank-k subgroup for any 1 ≤ k < n. In this case the subgroup decision assumption in G follows from the k-Linear assumption in G, which generalizes the DDH assumption. In particular, the 1-Linear assumption is DDH, while the 2-Linear assumption is the decision linear assumption. This more general construction makes explicit a relationship noticed by several previous authors (e.g., [20, 33] ), namely, that functionality that can be achieved in composite-order groups under the subgroup decision assumption can also be achieved in prime-order groups under either the DDH or the decision linear assumption.
If the group G is equipped with a pairingê : G×G → G t , then applyingê componentwise defines a pairing on G = G n . However, such a "symmetric" pairing (which only exists on supersingular elliptic curves) can be used to solve DDH in G, so in this case our DDH-based construction is not secure. To get around this problem we use the fact that on ordinary elliptic curves there are two distinguished subgroups, denoted G 1 and G 2 , in which DDH is believed to be infeasible for sufficiently large group orders. We can thus apply our construction twice to produce groups G = G n 1 , H = G n 2 , G t = G m t (for some m), and an "asymmetric" pairing e : G × H → G t . If the DDH assumption holds in G 1 and G 2 , then the subgroup decision assumption holds in G and H. (If we are using the d-Linear assumption with d ≥ 2, then we can remain in the symmetric setting.)
While the security of composite-order group protocols depends on (variants of) the subgroup decision assumption, the correctness of these protocols depends on the groups having certain additional properties. In some cases, the groups G, H, G t must be equipped with projection maps π 1 , π 2 , π t that map them onto proper subgroups and commute with the pairing. In other cases, the groups must decompose into subgroups G ∼ = G i and H ∼ = H i such that the pairing restricted to G i × H j is trivial whenever i = j. In Section 3 we define these properties in our abstract framework and show how to instantiate them in the product groups G n 1 , G n 2 . Sections 2 and 3 give us the framework and the tools necessary to convert composite-order group protocols to prime-order groups. Section 4 analyzes the efficiency gains realized in terms of the number of bits needed to represent group elements. For example, at a security level equivalent to 80-bit AES, ciphertexts in the Boneh-Goh-Nissim system can be up to three times smaller when instantiated using our prime-order construction than in the original composite-order system. At the 256-bit security level the improvement can be as large as a factor of 12.
In Sections 5, 6 , and 7, we describe in detail the conversion procedure for the Boneh-GohNissim cryptosystem, the Boneh-Sahai-Waters traitor tracing system, and the Katz-Sahai-Waters attribute-based encryption scheme, respectively. In each case we describe the scheme in our general framework and convert the assumptions used in the security proofs to our more general setting. We then consider the system instantiated with our prime-order group construction and give security theorems in this setting. If the original system is secure under a simple assumption (e.g., subgroup decision) then the converted scheme is also secure under a simple assumption (e.g., DDH); if the original system uses a complex assumption (as in the Katz-Sahai-Waters system) then the corresponding assumption in prime-order groups is also complex.
We note that our conversion process is not "black box": the security proof for each system must be analyzed to determine whether it carries over to our more general setting. For example, the recent identity-based encryption scheme of Lewko and Waters [24] uses explicitly in its security proof the fact that the group G has two subgroups of relatively prime order, and thus our techniques do not apply. However, we expect that our framework can be used to convert to prime-order groups other cryptosystems originally built using composite-order groups.
Subgroup Decision Problems
The problem of determining whether a given element g of a finite group G lies in a specified proper subgroup G 1 was used as a hardness assumption for constructing cryptosystems long before Boneh, Goh, and Nissim defined their "subgroup decision problem." Gjøsteen [18] has undertaken an extensive survey of such problems, which he calls "subgroup membership problems." For example, the quadratic residuosity problem is a subgroup membership problem: if we let N = pq be a product of two distinct primes and define the group G to be the group of elements of Z * N with Jacobi symbol 1, the problem is to determine whether a given element in G lies in the subgroup of squares in G.
Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [6] defined their problem for pairs of groups (G, G t ) of composite order N = pq for which there exists a nondegenerate bilinear map, or "pairing," e : G × G → G t . The problem is to determine whether a given element g ∈ G is in the subgroup of order p. Note that if g generates G, then e(g, g ) is a challenge element for the same problem in G t ; thus if the subgroup decision problem is infeasible in G then it is in G t as well.
Our general notion of a subgroup decision problem extends Gjøsteen's work to the bilinear setting. We begin by defining an object that generates the groups we will work with. We assume that the two groups input to the pairing are not identical (in the sense that there are no efficiently computable isomorphisms between them); this is known as an asymmetric pairing. We write all groups multiplicatively with identity element 1. Definition 2.1. A bilinear group generator is an algorithm G that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a description of five abelian groups G, G 1 , H, H 1 , G t , with G 1 ⊂ G and H 1 ⊂ H. We assume that this description permits efficient 2 group operations and random sampling in each group. The algorithm also outputs an efficiently computable map e : G × H → G t that is
• Bilinear: e(g 1 g 2 , h 1 h 2 ) = e(g 1 , h 1 )e(g 1 , h 2 )e(g 2 , h 1 )e(g 2 , h 2 ) for all g 1 , g 2 ∈ G, h 1 , h 2 ∈ H; and • Nondegenerate: for any g ∈ G, if e(g, h) = 1 for all h ∈ H, then g = 1 (and similarly with G, H reversed).
Our generalized subgroup decision assumption says that it is infeasible to distinguish an element in G 1 from a random element of G, and similarly for H. More precisely, we have the following definition. (The notation x R ← X means x is chosen uniformly at random from the set X.) Definition 2.2. Let G be a bilinear group generator. We define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the subgroup decision problem on the left to be Boneh, Goh, and Nissim's definition of the subgroup decision assumption does not require that the adversary be given an element of (or a means to sample from) G 1 ; however if G 1 is cyclic then their definition is equivalent to ours within a factor of 2 [7, Section 3] .
Example 2.3 ([6, Section 2.1]). Boneh, Goh, and Nissim construct a bilinear group generator G BGN using supersingular elliptic curves of composite order. Let E(λ) be an algorithm that outputs a product N = p 1 p 2 of two distinct primes greater than 2 λ , a prime q ≡ −1 (mod N ), and a supersingular elliptic curve E over the finite field F q . Then #E(F q ) is divisible by N , and we can construct G BGN (λ) by running E(λ) and setting the output as follows:
• G t is the order-N subgroup of F * q 2 ; and
Each group is described by giving a generator.
It is believed that G BGN satisfies the subgroup decision assumption when N is infeasible to factor. The construction can be extended to produce a group G whose order is a product of three or more primes, and the subgroup decision assumption is believed to hold in any nontrivial proper subgroup G 1 of G. Using the generic group analysis of Katz, Sahai, and Waters [23, Theorem A.2] , one can show that any efficient generic algorithm to solve the subgroup decision problem for G BGN can be used construct an efficient algorithm to factor N .
Product Groups, DDH, and d-Linear Assumptions
The primary motivation for our abstraction of composite-order group protocols is the observation that the decision Diffie-Hellman problem is also a subgroup decision problem [18, Section 4.5] .
Let G be a finite cyclic group, and let T = (g, g a , g b , g c ) be a 4-tuple of elements in G. The decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is to determine whether c ≡ ab (mod |g|); if this is infeasible then we say that G satisfies the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption. Now suppose we are given a DDH challenge T . Define G to be G × G and G 1 to be the cyclic subgroup of G generated by (g, g a ).
Then the element (g b , g c ) ∈ G is in G 1 if and only if c ≡ ab (mod |g|) -so solving the subgroup decision problem for G 1 ⊂ G is exactly equivalent to solving DDH in G.
Now we consider the same construction in the bilinear setting: let G 1 , G 2 , G t be finite cyclic groups, and letê : G 1 × G 2 → G t be a nondegenerate bilinear map. Then we can define G = G 2 1 , H = G 2 2 , and G t = G 2 t , and choose random elements of G and H to generate G 1 and H 1 respectively. We can define a nondegenerate pairing e : G × H → G t by taking any nonzero matrix A = a b c d ∈ Mat 2 (F p ) and setting
We can define a pairing mapping to G t = G m t by choosing different coefficients a, b, c, d to define each component of the output. With this setup, if the DDH assumption holds in G 1 and G 2 , then the subgroup decision assumption holds for G 1 ⊂ G and H 1 ⊂ H.
More generally, we consider a bilinear group generator G n k that produces two groups G = G n 1 and H = G n 2 and random rank-k subgroups G 1 ⊂ G and H 1 ⊂ H. In this situation the natural analogue of the DDH problem is the k-Linear problem, introduced by Hofheinz and Kiltz [21] and Shacham [30] . The 1-Linear problem is simply DDH, while the 2-Linear problem is called the decision linear problem and was originally proposed by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [5] as a reasonable analogue for DDH in a group with a bilinear map.
The following definition and theorem formalize the relationship between subgroup decision problems and d-Linear problems. We will use the following notation: if we have a group G of order p, an element g ∈ G, and a vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ F n p , then we define g x := (g x 1 , . . . , g xn ) ∈ G n . Definition 2.4. A bilinear group generator P is prime-order if the groups G, G 1 , H, H 1 , G t all have prime order p > 2 λ . Then we have G = G 1 and H = H 1 , and we denote the three distinct groups by G 1 = G, G 2 = H, and G t = G t . We letĜ denote the output (p,
If A is an algorithm that takes as input 2d + 2 elements of G 1 , we define the advantage of A in solving the d-Linear problem in G 1 to be
and similarly for d-Lin
is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial-time algorithm A (and similarly for G 2 ). The decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption is the 1-Linear assumption. The decision linear assumption is the 2-Linear assumption.
Some previous authors (e.g., [1, 20] ) have called the assumption that DDH is infeasible in both G 1 and G 2 the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption, or SXDH. For clarity in our arguments, we prefer to call the problems DDH in G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Theorem 2.5. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator. For integers n, k with n ≥ 2 and 1 ≤ k < n, define G n k to be a bilinear group generator that on input λ does the following:
. . , k, such that the sets { x i } and { y i } are each linearly independent. 5. Let G 1 be the subgroup of G generated by {g x 1 , . . . , g x k } and H 1 be the subgroup of H generated by {h y 1 , . . . , h y k } 6. Choose nonzero n × n matrices A = (a ( ) ij ) for = 1, . . . , m.
Define
. If P satisfies the k-Linear assumption in G 1 and G 2 , then G n k satisfies the subgroup decision assumption. Specifically, for any adversary A that solves the subgroup decision problem on the left for G n k , there exists an adversary B that solves the k-Linear problem in
The analogous statement holds for A solving the subgroup decision problem on the right for G n k on the right and B solving the k-Linear problem in G 2 for P.
Proof. Let x i = (x i,1 , . . . , x i,n ) be the vectors chosen in Step (4) of Theorem 2.5. Choose g 0
(i.e., a linear combination of the generators of G 1 ), and whose last n − j components are random. More precisely, we define
, . . . , g rn 0 ) :
where each sum in the exponent runs over i = 1 to k.
to be the group generated by (u
Since the b i are independently random, the k generators of G 1 remain independent and uniform in G n 1 . Now consider the tuple
.
then T is distributed as the element T in distribution A j , whereas if c is random then T is distributed as the element T in distribution A j−1 . It follows that any algorithm that distinguishes distribution A j from distribution A j−1 can be used to solve the k-Linear problem in G 1 . Now observe that the first k entries of the element T in distribution A k are independent and uniform in G 1 . Thus distribution A k is identical to an SDP challenge with a random element T 0 ∈ G. On the other hand, in distribution A n the element T is equal to g
, and thus distribution A n is identical to an SDP challenge with a random element T 1 ∈ G 1 . It follows that given any A that attacks the SDP on the left for G n k , we can construct a B solving the k-Linear problem in G 1 with
Since the d-Linear assumption implies the d + 1-Linear assumption for all d ≥ 1 [21, Lemma 3], if P satisfies the DDH assumption in G 1 and G 2 , then G n k satisfies the subgroup decision assumption for any n ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ k < n. The converse holds when k = 1. Proposition 2.6. Let P be as in Theorem 2.5. If G n 1 satisfies the subgroup decision assumption, then P satisfies the DDH assumption in G 1 and G 2 .
Proof. Let (g 1 , . . . , g n ) be the generator of G 1 and T = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) be the SDP challenge element. If we view all of the groups in the above construction as F p -vector spaces, then we see that the subgroup decision problem is a decisional version of the vector decomposition problem [34, 35, 17, 27] , in which the adversary is given a decomposition G ∼ = G 1 × G 2 and an element x ∈ G and asked to find y ∈ G 1 and z ∈ G 2 such that x = yz.
The vector decomposition problem was originally proposed for use in the context of a single elliptic or hyperelliptic curve. Okamoto and Takashima [27] proposed using products of supersingular elliptic curves; our construction generalizes this idea to products of any bilinear group. In our context, the subgroup decision problem is equivalent to the "decisional subspace problem" of Okamoto and Takashima. However, Okamoto and Takashima do not indicate any relationship between their decisional problem and decisional problems in the underlying groups.
Pairings on Product Groups
In our construction of the bilinear group generator G n k from the prime-order bilinear group generator P, we took the pairing e on the product groups to be any nontrivial linear combination of the componentwise pairings on the underlying prime-order group. However, the correctness proofs for protocols built in composite-order groups all use the fact that the pairings have some extra structure that arbitrary linear combinations are unlikely to have. We now investigate this structure further and determine how to replicate it in our product group context.
Projecting Pairings
The cryptosystem of Boneh, Goh, and Nissim works by taking elements g ∈ G and h ∈ G 1 and encrypting a message m as C = g m h r , where r is random. The h term is a "blinding term" used to hide the part of the ciphertext that contains the message. Decryption is achieved by "projecting" the ciphertext away from the blinding term and taking a discrete logarithm to recover m. Specifically, when g has order N = p 1 p 2 and h has order p 1 , the decryption can be achieved by first computing C p 1 to remove the h term, and then taking the discrete logarithm to the base g p 1 to recover m. The functionality of the cryptosystem requires that we can do this procedure either before or after the pairing; i.e., that we can construct and remove blinding terms in G t . The following definition incorporates this concept into our abstract framework. Definition 3.1. Let G be a bilinear group generator (Definition 2.1). We say that G is projecting if it also outputs a group G t ⊂ G t and three group homomorphisms π 1 , π 2 , π t mapping G, H, G t to themselves, respectively, such that 1. G 1 , H 1 , G t are contained in the kernels of π 1 , π 2 , π t , respectively, and
Example 3.2. The bilinear group generator G BGN of Example 2.3 is projecting: we let G t be the order-p 1 subgroup of G t , let π 1 = π 2 be exponentiation by p 1 , and let π t be exponentiation by (p 1 ) 2 .
Given a prime-order bilinear group generator P, we wish to modify the bilinear group generator G n k constructed in Theorem 2.5 so it is projecting. To do so, we interpret the generation of G 1 and H 1 in terms of matrix actions, and we define the pairing e using a tensor product of matrices. We begin by defining the projection maps π 1 and π 2 . Let G = G n 1 and let g be a generator of G 1 . For i = 1, . . . , n, let e i be the unit vector with a 1 in the ith place and zeroes elsewhere. To construct the projection map π 1 , we first observe that if G 1 is the subgroup of G generated by g e 1 , . . . , g e k , then any element of G 1 has 1's in the last n − k coordinates, so we can define a projection map π 1 whose kernel is G 1 by
Next we observe that the elements g x 1 , . . . , g x k produced by G n k can be viewed as coming from a (right) action of an n×n matrix on the elements g e 1 , . . . , g e k . More precisely, for g = (g 1 , . . . , g n ) ∈ G and a matrix M = (a ij ) ∈ Mat n (F p ), we define g M by
With this definition, we have (
Now let M be an invertible matrix whose first k rows are the vectors x i . Then g x i = g e i M . If we define U k to be the matrix with 1's in the last n − k diagonal places and zeroes elsewhere, then the map π 1 is given by π 1 (g) = g U k . Thus we can construct a projection map π 1 on G 1 by applying M −1 to map to G 1 , using π 1 to project, and acting by M to map back to G 1 ; that is,
We define π 2 analogously on H by computing an invertible matrix M whose first k rows are the y i produced by G n k . To define the pairing e, the subgroup G t , and the projection map π t , we use the tensor product from multilinear algebra. Recall that the tensor product of two n-dimensional vectors x, y is
We define e :
t by e(g x , h y ) :=ê(g, h) x⊗ y . That is, to pair g ∈ G and h ∈ H we take all the n 2 componentwise pairings e(g i , h j ) and write them in lexicographical order. In this case the A of Theorem 2.5 are the n 2 matrices with a 1 in entry (i, j) and zeroes elsewhere.
Defining the pairing in this manner allows us to define the map π t abstractly as the tensor product of the maps π 1 and π 2 . In terms of the matrices we have defined, we have
where ⊗ indicates the tensor product (or Kronecker product) of matrices: if A = (a ij ) and B = (b ij ) are two n × n matrices, then A ⊗ B is the n 2 × n 2 matrix which, when divided into n × n blocks, has the (i, j)th block equal to a ij B [22, Section 4.2] .
Given this framework, we see that the constructions of Groth and Sahai [20, Section 5 ] are exactly the above with (n, k) = (2, 1) and (3, 2) . We now give explicit details for the first case. This is the setup we will use to implement the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem in prime-order groups.
Example 3.3. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator. Define G P to be a bilinear group generator that on input λ does the following:
, let H 1 be the subgroup of H generated by (h a 2 , h b 2 ), and let G t be the subgroup of G t generated by
, and define
It is easy (though tedious) to check that G P is a projecting bilinear group generator. We note that the groups output by G P can be described simply by giving
In particular, the group G t is generated by elements of the form e(g, h 1 ) and e(g 1 , h) with g ∈ G, g 1 ∈ G 1 , h ∈ H, and h 1 ∈ H 1 . This is important since in our application the maps π 1 , π 2 , π t will be "trapdoor" information used as the system's secret key.
Proposition 3.4. If P satisfies the DDH assumption in G 1 and G 2 , then G P satisfies the subgroup decision assumption.
Proof. Since g is uniform in G 1 and a 1 , b 1 , c 1 are uniformly random in F p , imposing the condition
does not introduce any deviations from uniformity in the generation of G 1 (and similar for G 2 ). We can thus apply Theorem 2.5 with n = 2, k = 1.
Cancelling Pairings
The traitor-tracing scheme of Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [7] , the predicate encryption scheme of Katz, Sahai, and Waters [23] , and many other schemes based on bilinear groups of composite order use in an essential manner the fact that if two group elements g, h have relatively prime orders, then e(g, h) = 1. This property implies, for example, that we can use the two subgroups generated by g and h to encode different types of information, and the two components will remain distinct after the pairing operation. The following definition incorporates this concept into our framework.
Definition 3.5. Let G be a bilinear group generator (Definition 2.1). We say that G is r-cancelling if it also outputs groups G 2 , . . . , G r ⊂ G and H 2 , . . . , H r ⊂ H, such that
Example 3.6. The bilinear group generator G BGN of Example 2.3 is 2-cancelling: we set G 2 = H 2 to be the order-p 2 subgroup of E(F p ). An analogous r-cancelling generator can be built by making the group order N a product of r distinct primes.
Given a prime-order bilinear group generator P, we now show how to modify the bilinear group generator G n 1 constructed in Theorem 2.5 so it is n-cancelling. We begin by defining the pairing e : G × H → G t := G t to be
so in particular we have e(g x , h y ) = e(g, h) x· y , where · indicates the vector dot product. If G n 1 is n-cancelling, then the subgroups G i , H i are all cyclic of order p. Thus we need to choose generators g x i of G i and h y i of H i such that x i · y j = 0 if and only if i = j. This is straightforward: we first choose any set of n linearly independent x i ; then the equation x i · y j = 0 for all i = j gives a linear system n variables of rank n − 1, so there is a one-dimensional solution space in F n p . If we choose y j in this space then with high probability we have x j · y j = 0; if this is not the case then we can start again with a different set of x i . We illustrate with concrete examples for n = 2 and 3. We use the notation X to indicate the cyclic group generated by X.
Example 3.7. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator. Define G 3C to be a bilinear group generator that on input λ does the following:
Define the subgroups
It is straightforward to show that G 3C is a 3-cancelling bilinear group generator. The inequalities in Step (4) guarantee that the G i and H i are linearly independent, which implies that the pairing e is nondegenerate. Note that choosing the elements g 1 , g 2 , g 3 independently uniform allows us to scale the vectors x 1 = (1, x, u), x 2 = (1, y, v), x 3 = (1, z, w) so their first components are 1 without losing uniformity.
Example 3.8. We define a 2-cancelling bilinear group generator G 2C by restricting the construction in Example 3.7 to the first two components. Explicitly, we have G = G 2 1 , H = G 2 2 , G t = G 2 t and we set u = 0, v = 0, w = 1 to obtain h ) ), and we output the tuple
Example 3.9. If we have a symmetric pairing (i.e. G 1 = G 2 ), then for any n > k > 1 we can obtain an (n − k + 1)-cancelling bilinear group generator G L (n, k) by doing the following: 1) and output (G, G 1 , . . . , G n−k+1 , G t , e). Proposition 3.10. If P satisfies the DDH assumption in G 1 and G 2 , then G 3C and G 2C satisfy the subgroup decision assumption. If G 1 = G 2 and P satisfies the k-linear assumption in G 1 , then G L (n, k) satisfies the subgroup decision assumption.
Proof. Recall that an SDP adversary is given only G, G 1 , H, H 1 , and not a description of any G i or H i for i ≥ 2. Since in each case the generators of G 1 and H 1 are independent and uniform, the outputs of G 3C , G 2C , and G L (n, k) are distributed identically to the output of G n k (with (n, k) = (3, 1) for G 3C and (2, 1) for G 2C ), so we may apply Theorem 2.5.
Performance Analysis
Our primary motivation for converting composite-order group protocols to prime-order groups is to improve efficiency in implementations. As discussed in the introduction, this improvement results from the fact that we can use smaller prime-order groups than composite-order groups at equivalent security levels. We now examine this improvement concretely. Specifically, we compare the sizes of the groups G, H, and G t produced by the bilinear group generator G BGN (Example 2.3) with the four examples from Section 3 of bilinear group generators built from prime-order generators.
For the generators G P (Example 3.3), G 3C (Example 3.7), and G 2C (Example 3.8) we take the prime-order bilinear group generator P to be an algorithm that produces a "pairing-friendly" ordinary elliptic curve E over a finite field F q . On such curves there are two "distinguished" subgroups G 1 and G 2 of order p in which the DDH problem is presumed to be infeasible, and such that the Tate pairingê :
Here k is the embedding degree, defined to be the smallest integer such that p divides the order of F * q k . The ordinary elliptic curves E that give the best performance while providing discrete log security comparable to three commonly proposed levels of AES security are as follows. The group sizes follow the 2007 NIST recommendations [2] ; further details can be found in Appendix A.
80-bit security:
A 170-bit Miyaji-Nakabayashi-Takano curve [26] with embedding degree 6; 128-bit security: A 256-bit Barreto-Naehrig curve [3] with embedding degree 12. 256-bit security: A 640-bit Brezing-Weng curve [11] with embedding degree 24.
The advantage of the generator G L is that we can use a prime-order group with a symmetric pairing, which only exists on supersingular elliptic curves. Thus in this case we take P to produce a supersingular curve over F 3 m with embedding degree k = 6 (the maximum possible k for supersingular curves [25] ). The fields that provide the best "match" for group orders at our three security levels are F 3 111 , F 3 323 , and F 3 1615 . The restriction to embedding degree k ≤ 6 means that at high security levels the group G 1 will be much larger than the group G 1 on an equivalent ordinary curve. Table 1 compares the sizes of the groups produced by all five bilinear group generators at each of the three security levels. In all cases the groups G and H built using products of prime-order groups are much smaller than the groups G and H built using composite-order groups. The group G t for the projecting generator G P is twice as large as the composite-order G t , due to the fact that elements of G t are four elements of F q k . However, the groups G t for the cancelling generators G 2C , G 3C , G L are half as large as the composite-order G t . The last column indicates the number of elliptic curve pairings required to compute the pairing e for the specified generator. While the prime-order generators require more pairings than the composite-order generator G BGN , the sizes of the elliptic curve groups in this case are so much smaller that the pairings will be far more than four times faster. For example, the Tate pairing on a 1024-bit supersingular curve runs ≈ 50 times slower than the Tate pairing on a 170-bit MNT curve [29] , so a pairing for G P at the 80-bit security level will be roughly 12 times faster than a pairing for G BGN .
Application 1: The BGN Cryptosystem
Our first application of the framework developed above is to the public-key encryption scheme of Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [6] . This scheme has the feature that given two ciphertexts, one can create a new ciphertext that encrypts either the sum or the product of the corresponding plaintexts. The product operation can only be carried out once; the system is thus "partially doubly homomorphic."
Step 1 of the conversion process is to write the scheme in the abstract framework and transfer it to asymmetric groups. In the original BGN protocol any ciphertext may be paired with any other ciphertext, so in the asymmetric setting each computation in G must be duplicated in H. We must use a projecting pairing, as the decryption algorithm requires projection away from a certain subgroup. (Indeed, we defined the projecting property by using the BGN scheme as our model.)
KeyGen(λ)
← H, and output the public key P K = (G, G 1 , H, H 1 , G t , e, g, h) and the secret key SK = (π 1 , π 2 , π t ).
(Recall that the output of G allows random sampling from G 1 and 
Decrypt(SK, C):
The input ciphertext C can be an element of G, H, or G t .
1
It is clear that if C, C are encryptions of m, m respectively, then the Add algorithm gives a correctly distributed encryption of m + m . Furthermore, it follows from the bilinear property of the pairing that if C A ∈ G, C B ∈ H are the left and right halves of encryptions of m, m respectively, then the Multiply algorithm gives a correctly distributed encryption of m · m . Since there is no pairing on G t we can only perform the multiplication once.
Correctness of decryption of ciphertexts in G and H follows from the fact that G 1 , H 1 are in the kernels of π 1 , π 2 , respectively. Correctness of decryption of ciphertexts in G t follows from both "projecting" properties of G; for example, we have π t (e(g, h 1 )) = e(π 1 (g), π 2 (h 1 )) = e(π 1 (g), 1) = 1.
Step 2 of the conversion process is to translate the security assumptions to asymmetric bilinear groups. In this case, semantic security of ciphertexts in G follows from the subgroup decision assumption on the left for G. Intuitively, if G satisfies the subgroup decision assumption on the left, then an adversary cannot distinguish the real system from a "fake" system in which g ∈ G 1 . Semantic security then follows from the fact that in the fake system the ciphertext element C A will be a uniformly random element of G 1 and thus will contain no information about the message m. The same argument holds for ciphertexts in H, and semantic security of ciphertexts in G t follows from semantic security in G and H. For further details see [6, Theorem 3.1] .
Step 3 is to translate the assumption to prime-order groups. Since the security proof uses no intrinsic properties of the groups G and H, it carries over to our more general setting. This is the main result of our construction, so we record it as a theorem; the proof follows directly from [6 
When instantiated with either G BGN or G P , decryption in the BGN system requires taking discrete logarithms in a group of large prime order. Thus to achieve efficient decryption the message space must be small (i.e., logarithmic in the group size). It is an open problem to find a bilinear group generator G for which the subgroup decision assumption holds and for which discrete logarithms can be computed in a subset of π 1 (G) whose size is a constant fraction of the full group order.
If we carry out the tensor product construction described in Section 3.1 for any k and n ≥ k + 1, we obtain an instantiation of the BGN cryptosystem whose security depends on the kLinear assumption. Since ciphertexts will consist of n elements of G 1 or G 2 or n 2 elements of G t , these systems will in general be less efficient than the system constructed using G P , which has (n, k) = (2, 1). We do note, however, that if k ≥ 2 we can use a group with a symmetric pairing, in which case the Encrypt algorithm needs only to output the ciphertext C A .
Okamoto and Takashima [27, Section 5] also suggest instantiating the BGN system using products of cyclic groups, but their system does not provide the product functionality on ciphertexts.
Application 2: Traitor Tracing
Traitor tracing systems, introduced by Chor, Fiat, and Naor [12] , allow content distributors to identify pirates. In such a system, the distributor broadcasts encrypted content to N legitimate users, each of whom has a secret key that allows the user to decrypt. If an unauthorized user creates a "pirate decoder" that can decrypt content, the distributor can identify (or "trace") which user's key was compromised simply by attempting to decrypt certain messages with the pirate decoder.
Boneh, Sahai, and Waters [7] devised a traitor tracing system that is fully collusion resistant (i.e., even a pirate with all but one secret key can be traced) and has ciphertext length O( √ N ), where N is the number of users in the system. They build the system from a new primitive called private linear broadcast encryption system (or PLBE). Formal definitions of the syntax and security of a PLBE scheme appear in Appendix B. After reducing the construction of a traitor tracing scheme to the construction of a PLBE scheme, Boneh et al. devise a PLBE scheme using bilinear groups of composite order and show it secure under three assumptions in bilinear groups.
In this section we apply our framework to convert the Boneh et al. PLBE scheme to prime-order groups. When we instantiate the scheme using the bilinear group generator G 2C of Example 3.8, we obtain a system that is secure under the DDH assumption in G 1 and G 2 and an assumption called the "3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption" in G 1 .
Construction
Step 1 is to write the original system in a general context. In the system users are indexed as entries in an m × m matrix. In the symmetric setting ciphertexts contain three group elements R x ,R x , A x ∈ G and B x ∈ G t for each row x in the matrix, and two group elements C y ,C y ∈ G for each column y in the matrix. User (x, y) has a key K x,y ∈ G and decrypts by computing
When we convert to the asymmetric situation, we must take one argument of each of the three pairings to be in G and the other argument to be in H. We choose to assign the first argument of each pairing to G and the second argument to H. We note that the correctness properties of the system depend on cancellation between different subgroups when paired, so we must use a cancelling pairing. The scheme is as follows.
Setup(λ, n): The Setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and a positive integer n = m 2 that is the number of users in the system. Let G be a 2-cancelling bilinear group generator (Definition 3.5) such that each output group G j , H j is cyclic of prime order p j for j = 1, 2. Do the following.
Output the public parameters (G, H, G t , e, N ), along with
The private key for user (x, y) is K x,y = g αx+rxcy ∈ G. The master secret key SK consists of the elements chosen in Step (2) and the exponents chosen in Step (3) above.
TrEncrypt(SK, M, (i, j):
This algorithm encrypts the message M ∈ G t to the subset of receivers (x, y) with either x > i or x = i and y ≥ j. Choose t, w 1 , . . . , w m , s 1 , . . . , s m , z 1 , . . . , z j
N . For each row x output four ciphertext components R x , R x , A x ∈ H and B x ∈ G t as follows:
For each column y output two ciphertext components C y ,C y ∈ G as follows:
if y ≥ j: C y = g cyt f wy ,C y = g wy if y < j:
This algorithm encrypts message M ∈ G t to all recipients. Choose t, w 1 , . . . , w m , s 1 , . . . , s m R ← Z N . For each row x output four ciphertext components R x , R x , A x ∈ H and B x ∈ G t as follows:
The cancelling property of the pairing implies that if the ciphertext was created from the tracing algorithm TrEncrypt with parameters (i, j) then the result of decryption with key K x,y is M if x > 1 or x = 1 and y ≥ j. If the ciphertext was created using Encrypt then all parties can decrypt with their secret key to recover M .
Security Assumptions
Step 2 is to convert the assumptions used in proving security of the Boneh et al. PLBE scheme to our more general framework. There are three assumptions: the subgroup decision assumption, the 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption, and the bilinear subgroup decision assumption.
The subgroup decision assumption we have discussed previously (see Section 2). In examining Boneh et al.'s security proof, we see that the challenge element T in the subgroup decision problem is used only to construct ciphertext elements R x ,R x , A x ∈ H. Thus the assumption needs to hold only in H.
In the symmetric version of the 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption the adversary is given g, g a , g b , g c , T in a certain subgroup of G and asked to determine whether T = g abc or T is random. The fixed challenge elements g, g a , g b , g c are used in the simulations to form all ciphertext components, so we need to duplicate them in G and H. The "variable" element T is only used to construct one component, but the proof involves a number of hybrid games and T may appear in different groups in different games. Thus we define a "left" and a "right" version of the assumption in the asymmetric setting.
Definition 6.1 (3-party decision Diffie-Hellman assumption). Let G be a 2-cancelling bilinear group generator such that for i = 1, 2 the output groups G i and H i are of prime order p i . We define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the 3-party decision Diffie-Hellman assumption on the left to be
We say that G satisfies the 3-party decision Diffie-Hellman assumption on the left if 3DDH L -Adv[A, G](λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial-time algorithm A.
We define the 3-party decision Diffie-Hellman assumption on the right and 3DDH R -Adv[A, G] analogously, with T 0 ← h abc 2 and T 1
In the symmetric setting the bilinear subgroup decision problem is to distinguish an element of the subgroup e(G 2 , G) from a random element in G t when given generators for G 1 and G 2 . Since we require G i and H i to have the same order in the asymmetric case, the assumption translates directly to the asymmetric setting.
Definition 6.2 (Bilinear subgroup decision assumption).
Let G be a 2-cancelling bilinear group generator such that for i = 1, 2 the output groups G i and H i are of prime order p i . We define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the bilinear subgroup decision assumption to be
We say that G satisfies the bilinear subgroup decision assumption if BSD-Adv[A, G](λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial-time algorithm A.
The reason the BSD assumption does not reduce to the ordinary subgroup decision assumption (with G 1 , G 2 switched) is that in the latter the challenger is not given generators of both G 1 and
With these definitions, we can now state the security theorem for the generalized Boneh-SahaiWaters scheme. The original proof applies in our more general context. Theorem 6.3. Suppose that G satisfies the subgroup decision assumption on the right, the bilinear subgroup decision assumption, and the 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumptions on the left and right. Then the generalized Boneh-Sahai-Waters PLBE scheme is secure.
Security in Prime-Order Groups
Step 3 in the conversion procedure is to translate the security assumptions to prime-order groups; here we use the 2-cancelling bilinear group generator G 2C of Example 3.8. The subgroup decision assumption holds for G 2C by Proposition 3.10. The challenge element for the bilinear subgroup decision assumption is e(g, h) ∈ G t with h R ← H and either g R ← G or g R ← G 1 . Since the group G t produced by G 2C is cyclic, this assumption holds unconditionally for G 2C . The 3-party DDH assumption has a natural analogue in prime-order groups, which we record here. Definition 6.4. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator that outputs three groups G 1 , G 2 , G t and a pairingê. If A is an algorithm that takes as input five elements of G 1 , we define the advantage of A in solving the 3-party decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G 1 to be
and similarly for 3DDH G 2 -Adv[A, P]. We say that G satisfies the 3-party DDH assumption in
is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial-time algorithm A (and similarly for G 2 ).
In Appendix D we show that the 3-party DDH assumption holds in the generic group model. The security theorem for PLBE in prime-order groups is as follows.
Theorem 6.5. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator, and let G 2C be the 2-cancelling bilinear group generator constructed from P as in Example 3.8. If P satisfies the DDH assumption in G 2 and the 3-party DDH assumptions in G 1 and G 2 , then the Boneh-Sahai-Waters PLBE system is secure when instantiated with G = G 2C .
Proof. It suffices to show that the three assumptions listed in Theorem 6.3 hold for G 2C . First, by Proposition 3.10, since P satisfies the DDH assumption in G 2 , the generator G 2C satisfies the SDP assumption on the right. Next, we observe that the bilinear subgroup decision assumption (Definition 6.2) holds unconditionally. To see this, we write the f 1 , f 2 , h 1 , h 2 generated in the assumption as
, while e(f 1 f 2 , h 1 h 2 ) = e(α 1 , β 1 ) (x−y)ê (α 2 , β 2 ) (y−x) . Since the α i , β i are chosen uniformly at random, both e(f 2 , h 1 h 2 ) and e(f 1 f 2 , h 1 h 2 ) are uniformly distributed in G t = G t , so no adversary A can have a nonzero advantage in solving the BSD problem. Now suppose we are given a 3-party DDH challenge for P; that is, a tuple (g, g a , g b , g c , h, h a , h b , h c , T ) with g, T ∈ G 1 and h ∈ G 2 . We wish to create a properly distributed 3-party DDH challenge for
then these groups are distributed exactly as in the construction of G 2C . Furthermore, if γ = (g, g y ) then we can construct γ a , γ b , γ c ∈ G, and similarly for η = (h −x , h), η a , η b , η c ∈ H. Finally, the challenge element τ ∈ G is constructed as (T, T y ). Thus we have constructed a properly distributed 3-party DDH challenge on the left for G 2C , so any adversary A that solves the 3-party DDH problem on the left for G 2C can be used to solve the 3-party DDH problem in G 1 for P. An identical analysis holds on the right.
Application 3: Predicate Encryption
In a predicate encryption scheme, a ciphertext C I is associated with an attribute I and each user has one or more keys K f corresponding to predicates f . The key K f can be used to decrypt the ciphertext C I if and only if f (I) = 1. The scheme is secure if an adversary holding key K f and ciphertext C I with f (I) = 0 learns nothing about either the plaintext corresponding to C I or the attribute I. (Formal definitions of syntax and security are in Appendix C.) Katz, Sahai, and Waters [23] construct a predicate encryption scheme using bilinear groups whose order is a product N of three distinct primes. In the system both predicates and attributes correspond to vectors of length n over Z N . Predicates are evaluated using dot products: the predicate vector v evaluates to 1 on the attribute vector x if and only if x • v = 0. 3 The security of the system is based on two complex (though constant-size) assumptions in composite-order bilinear groups. To support their assumptions, Katz et al. show that breaking either assumption in the generic group model reveals the factorization of the group order N .
In this section, we translate the predicate encryption scheme of Katz et al. into our more general framework. The security assumptions translate into similarly complex assumptions; however, when instantiated using prime-order bilinear groups they also hold in the generic group model.
Construction.
Step 1 is to write the procedure using a bilinear group generator with an asymmetric pairing. We note that the decryption algorithm requires pairing ciphertexts with keys. Thus we may streamline the setup by computing ciphertexts in G and keys in H. Since public key elements are used to form ciphertexts, they will also be in G. Here the correctness properties depend on cancellation between various subgroups; specifically, we need to choose a bilinear group generator G that is 3-cancelling. We now give a detailed description of the "full-fledged" predicate encryption scheme of Katz et al. [23, Appendix C] in our framework.
Setup(λ, n): The Setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and a positive integer n that is the length of vectors that represent predicates and attributes. Let G be a 3-cancelling bilinear group generator (Definition 3.5) such that each output group G j , H j has prime exponent p j for j = 1 to 3. Do the following.
Output the public parameters (G, H, G t , e, N := lcm(p 1 , p 2 , p 3 )), along with
. 
The master secret key is SK
. . , x n ) ∈ Z n N be an attribute, and M ∈ G t be a message. Choose s, α, β R ← Z N and random t 1,i , t 2,i R ← Z N for i = 1, . . . , n. Output the ciphertext
The cancelling property of the pairing implies that when the ciphertexts and secret keys are formed correctly, the decryption algorithm outputs M · e(g 1 , h 1 ) (αf 1 +βf 2 )( x• v) . If x • v = 0 then we obtain M as required; otherwise we obtain M multiplied by e(g 1 , h 1 ) raised to a random power. As in the original scheme, we can restrict the message space to some efficiently recognizable set of negligible density in G t and output an error when the decryption does not lie in this space.
Security
Step 2 is to translate the assumptions used to prove the scheme secure into our more general context. There are two assumptions, which we call Assumptions 1 and 2. Both can be seen as variants of the subgroup decision problem: the adversary is given a set of elements Z ⊂ G with some specified relationship, and is asked to determine whether a challenge element T is in a proper subgroup of G.
The following two assumptions, stated in symmetric groups, are used to prove the security of the Katz-Sahai-Waters predicate encryption scheme. Assumption 1. Let G be a 3-cancelling bilinear group generator such that for i = 1, 2, 3 the output groups G i and H i are equal to each other and of prime exponent p i . We define the following distribution:
. We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 1 to be
We say that G satisfies Assumption 1 if A1-Adv[A, G](λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial-time algorithm A. Assumption 2. Let G be as in Assumption 1. We define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 2 to be
We say that G satisfies Assumption 2 if A2-Adv[A, G](λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial-time algorithm A.
To translate these assumptions to the asymmetric setting with a pairing e : G × H → G t , we must look into the "guts" of the reductions in the original security proof. In particular, we must determine whether each group element in a challenge (Z, T ) is used by the simulator to produce a key element in G, a ciphertext element in H, or both. We do not repeat the details of the simulations, but give our conclusions in Table 2 below.
Thus to modify Assumption 1 for the asymmetric setting, we must also choose h i R ← H i and set
To modify Assumption 2 for the asymmetric setting, we choose h i R ← H i and set
2)
The challenge elements for Assumption 2 are used to produce ciphertext elements in G used to produce key elements in H in Gt
3 Security in Prime-Order Groups: Asymmetric Case
Step 3 of the conversion procedure is to instantiate the scheme using prime-order groups. We use the 3-cancelling bilinear group generator G 3C of Example 3.7. Let P be the prime-order group generator from which we construct G 3C . We now translate the asymmetric versions of Assumptions 1 and 2 explicitly to this setting, obtaining two (constant-size) assumptions for P. For the first assumption, the set of challenge elements in the general setting is given by (7.1).
Assumption 3. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator. We define the following distribution:
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 3 to be
We say that G satisfies Assumption 3 if A3-Adv[A, G](λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial-time algorithm A.
For the second assumption, the set of challenge elements in the general setting is given by (7.2).
Assumption 4. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator. We define the following distribution:
), e(g 1 , h 1 ) (xw−xv+yu−yw−zu+zv)aγ .
We define the advantage of an algorithm A in breaking Assumption 4 to be
We say that G satisfies Assumption 4 if A4-Adv[A, G](λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial-time algorithm A.
We obtain the following security theorem.
Theorem 7.1. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator, and let G 3C be the 3-cancelling bilinear group generator constructed from P in Example 3.7. If P satisfies Assumptions 3 and 4, then the Katz-Sahai-Waters predicate encryption scheme is secure when instantiated with G = G 3C .
In Appendix D we show that Assumptions 3 and 4 hold in the generic group model. This result does not necessarily mean that the assumptions hold when instantiated with any specific group; however, it does suggest that we should favor these assumptions neither more nor less than the assumptions in composite-order groups from which they are derived.
Security in Prime-Order Groups: Symmetric Case
As an alternative to the construction in the previous section, we show how to instantiate the Katz et al. scheme using primer-order groups with a symmetric pairing. Specifically, we use the 3-cancelling bilinear group generator G L (4, 2) of Example 3.9. Since we are required to use supersingular curves in this case, the scheme will be less efficient than the scheme instantiated with an asymmetric pairing (cf. Table 1 ). However, we are able to prove security from much simpler assumptions: namely, the decision linear assumption and the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, which we now state. Definition 7.2 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption). Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator that outputs groups G, G t and a symmetric pairingê : G × G → G t . If A is an algorithm that takes as input four elements of G and one element of G t , we define the advantage of A in solving the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem to be
We say that G satisfies the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption if 3DDH-Adv[A, G](λ) is a negligible function of λ for any polynomial-time algorithm A.
The reason we are able to simplify the security assumptions in the symmetric case is that it is possible, given an element g 1 ∈ G 1 , to construct an element g 2 ∈ G such that e(g 1 , g 2 ) = 1. We can then take G 2 to be the group generated by g 2 , and this group satisfies the required cancellation property; we can undertake a similar process to generate G 3 , and use all of these groups to simulate challenges to Assumptions 1 and 2. In the composite-order and asymmetric cases we cannot construct the subgroups G 2 , G 3 , so we must rely on the more complex assumption. Proposition 7.3. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator with a symmetric pairing, and let G L (4, 2) be the 3-cancelling bilinear group generator constructed from P as in Example 3.9. If P satisfies the decision linear assumption, then G L (4, 2) satisfies Assumption 1.
Proof. Let G, G t be the groups output by P, and let G = G 4 . Given a decision linear challenge (u 1 , u 2 , v 1 , v 2 , y, z), we construct a tuple Z and an element T distributed as in a challenge for Assumption 1. Our strategy is to use the decision linear challenge to construct a subgroup G 1 ⊂ G and then construct subgroups G 2 and G 3 satisfying the cancellation properties. We then use Lemma ?? to randomize these subgroups so their distribution is identical to the output of G L (4, 2) while maintaining the cancellation property.
We begin by choosing x, y R ← F 3 p , and setting
Note that g 3 ∈ G 3 and e(g 2 , g 3 ) = 1. Now choose an orthogonal matrix M and apply it to all of these elements.
Note that there exists a vector g 4 ∈ G 3 such that {g 3 , g 4 } generate G 3 and e(g 2 , g 4 ) = 1. However There exists a one-dimensional space of elements in G 3
2 . If z = y r 1 +r 2 then T = g ( 3 1/a), while if z is uniformly random in G then T is uniformly random in the subgroup of G 4 whose last entry is 1. Now let α = (x 1 y 2 − y 1 x 2 ) −1 and set
Proposition 7.4. Let P and G L (4, 2) be as in Proposition 7.3. If P satisfies the bilinear DiffieHellman assumption, then G L (4, 2) satisfies Assumption 2.
Our security theorem now follows directly from Propositions 7.3 and 7.4.
Theorem 7.5. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator with a symmetric pairing, and let G L (4, 2) be the 3-cancelling bilinear group generator constructed from P in Example 3.9. If P satisfies the decision linear assumption and the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, then the KatzSahai-Waters predicate encryption scheme is secure when instantiated with G = G L (4, 2) .
Proof. Let G, G t be the groups output by P, and let G = G 4 . Given a bilinear subgroup decision challenge (g, g a , g b , g c , γ), we construct a tuple Z and an element T distributed as in a challenge for Assumption 2. To do this, we choose g 2 , g 3 R ← G and c 1 , c 2 R ← Z p , and set
, e(g, oops)
Further Work
We expect that our framework can be used to create prime-order group instantiations of other cryptosystems that use composite-order bilinear groups. However, since our construction is not black box, the security proof of each cryptosystem will need to be checked to ensure that it is still valid in our more general framework. For example, the zero-knowledge proofs of Groth, Ostrovsky, and Sahai [19] use in an essential manner the fact that a group element can be paired with itself, so we cannot instantiate this system using an asymmetric pairing. However, we do expect that the system can be instantiated with a symmetric pairing under the decision linear assumption using the bilinear group generator G L of Example 3.9.
As another example, the proof of the Lewko-Waters identity-based encryption system [24] uses in an essential way the fact that G has two subgroups with relatively prime order; thus our primeorder construction does not apply in this case. Lewko and Waters do give a version of their system in prime-order groups, with a different security proof under new assumptions. It remains an open problem to find a framework that incorporates the security proofs of both versions of the system.
A Pairing-Friendly Elliptic Curves
To describe pairing-friendly elliptic curves we first review some notation. Let q > 3 be a prime. If E is an elliptic curve over a finite field F q , then E(F q ) denotes the F q -rational points of E. We let E[n] denote all points of E with order dividing n, defined over any extension of F q ; if n is prime to q then E[n] ∼ = Z 2 n . If r is a prime dividing #E(F q ) and not dividing q, the embedding degree of E with respect to r is the smallest integer such that q k ≡ 1 (mod r). If E has embedding degree k with respect to r then E(F q k ) has two linearly independent subgroups of order r and the modified Tate pairing on E[p] takes values in F * q k [14, Section 2.1]. A "pairing-friendly" curve is one that has a small embedding degree (e.g., k ≤ 50) with respect to a large prime-order subgroup (e.g., p > 2 160 ).
If E is has embedding degree k > 1 with respect to r then there are two distinguished order-r subgroups of E(F q k ): namely, the group G 1 of rational points of order r, i.e., E(F q ) ∩ E[r], and the group G 2 of points of order r in the trace-zero subgroup of E(F q k )., i.e.,
where indicates addition on the elliptic curve and O is the identity element. Equivalently, we can define G 1 and G 2 as the subgroups of E[r] on which the q-power Frobenius endomorphism acts as multiplication by 1 and q, respectively. If E is ordinary (i.e., #E(F q ) = q + 1), then there is no known efficient algorithm for solving the DDH problem in either G 1 or G 2 . In particular, the Weil and Tate pairings are trivial when restricted to either G 1 or G 2 [16, Lemma IX.16 ], so we cannot use the pairing to solve DDH in either group. If we let G t be the order-p subgroup of F * q k andê be the modified Tate pairing, then we set the output of the bilinear group generator P to be (r, G 1 , G 2 , G t ,ê). (Of course, in an application the roles of G 1 and G 2 could be switched in order to make the group of F q -rational points the one in which the most computation is done.)
An ordinary elliptic curve E as above not only provides an example of a bilinear group in which DDH is hard, but also admits arbitrary embedding degree k. This last fact allows us to scale the sizes of the groups E(F q ) ⊃ G 1 and F * q k ⊃ G t independently, providing maximum efficiency for any desired security level (see e.g. [15] ). By contrast, symmetric pairings are restricted to embedding degree k = 2 over prime fields and to k ≤ 6 in general [25] .
The three ordinary elliptic curves we choose to match our specified levels of AES security are as follows:
80-bit security:
We use a Miyaji-Nakabayashi-Takano elliptic curve E over a 170-bit field F q with a prime group order p = #E(F q ) and embedding degree 6 [26] . If E is the quadratic twist of E over F q , we can represent elements of G 2 as points in the trace-zero subgroup of E (F q 3 ). This group has order very close to q 2 , so if we use the compression method of Rubin and Silverberg [28, Section 10], we can represent elements in G 2 using 340 bits. 128-bit security: We use a Barreto-Naehrig elliptic curve E over a 256-bit field F q with a prime group order p = #E(F q ) and embedding degree 12 [3] . We can represent elements of G 2 as points on a sextic twist of E over F p 2 . This group has order very close to q 2 , so we can represent elements in G 2 using 512 bits. 256-bit security: We use a Brezing-Weng elliptic curve E over a 640-bit field F q that has a 512-bit prime-order subgroup and embedding degree 24 [11] . We can represent elements of G 2 as points on a sextic twist of E over F q 4 . This group has order very close to q 4 , so we can represent elements in G 2 using 2560 bits.
B Private Linear Broadcast Encryption: Definitions
In this section we give the formal definition of a private linear broadcast encryption system and define what it means for the system to be secure. This material appears in [7, Section 2] and is duplicated here for ease of reference.
B.1 Syntax
Formally, a PLBE system is comprised of four probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms:
Setup(λ, n): Takes as input a security parameter λ and a positive integer n that is the number of users in the system. The algorithm outputs a public key P K, a secret key SK, and private keys K 1 , . . . , K n , where key K i is given to user i. Encrypt(P K, M ): Takes as input a public key P K and a message M and outputs a ciphertext C.
This algorithm is used to encrypt a message to all N users. TrEncrypt(SK, i, M ): Takes as input a secret key SK, an integer i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, and a message M , and outputs a ciphertext C. This algorithm encrypts a message to a set {i, . . . , N } and is primarily used for traitor tracing. We will require below that TrEncrypt(SK, 1, M ) outputs a distribution on ciphertexts that is indistinguishable from the distribution generated by Encrypt(P K, M ). Decrypt(j, K j , C, P K): Takes as input a private key K j for user j, a ciphertext C, and the public key P K. The algorithm outputs a message M or the symbol ⊥.
The system must satisfy the following correctness property for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N + 1}, with j ≤ N , and all messages M :
B.2 Security
Security of a PLBE system is defined using three games. The first game captures a consistency property which says that TrEncrypt(T K, 1, M ) outputs a distribution on ciphertexts that is indistinguishable from the distribution generated by Encrypt(P K, M ). The second game is a "message hiding" game and says that a ciphertext created using index i = n + 1 is unreadable by anyone. The third game is an "index hiding" game and captures the intuition that a broadcast ciphertext created using index i reveals no non-trivial information about i. We consider all these games for a fixed number of users n.
Game 1 -Indistinguishability. The first game says that the output of TrEncrypt(SK, 1, M ) is indistinguishable from Encrypt(P K, M ). The game proceeds as follows:
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the adversary P K and the set of all private keys {K 1 , . . . , K n }.
• Challenge: The adversary gives the challenger a message M . The challenger chooses β R ← {0, 1} and computes
It gives C to the adversary.
• Guess: The adversary returns a guess β ∈ {0, 1} for β. Game 3 -Index Hiding. The third game says that an adversary cannot distinguish between an encryption to index i and one to index i + 1 without the key K i . The game takes as input a parameter i ∈ {1, . . . , N } which is given to both the challenger and the adversary. The game proceeds as follows:
• Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives the adversary P K and the set of all private keys {K j : j = i}.
• Challenge: The adversary gives the challenger a message M . The challenger chooses β R ← {0, 1} and computes C R ← TrEncrypt(T K, i + β, M ). The challenger returns C to the adversary.
• Guess: The adversary returns a guess β ∈ {0, 1} for β.
We define the advantage of adversary
Now that the three games are established we are ready to define secure PLBE. 
C Predicate Encryption: Definitions
In this section we give the formal definition of a predicate encryption scheme and define what it means for the system to be secure. This material appears in [23, Section 2] and is duplicated here for ease of reference.
C.2 Security.
The Katz et al. construction produces a predicate encryption scheme where the set of attributes in Σ = Z n N and the class of predicates is F = {f x : x ∈ Z n N }. Security of such a system is defined using the following game. (Compare with [23, Definition 2.2 and Definition B.1].) As before, we use a large • to denote the dot product of vectors over Z N .
1. Setup(λ, n) is run to generate keys P K, SK. This defines a value N which is given to A.
2.
A outputs x, y ∈ Z n N , and is then given P K. A is given C ← Encrypt(P K, y, M 1 ). 6. The adversary may continue to request keys for additional predicates, subject to the same restrictions as before. 7. A outputs a bit β ., and succeeds if β = β. 
D Security of Predicate Encryption in Generic Prime-Order Groups
The security of the Katz-Sahai-Waters predicate encryption scheme using the bilinear generator G 3C depends on the complex (though constant-size) Assumptions 3 and 4. To determine whether these assumptions are reasonable, we wish to determine whether they hold in the generic group model [32] . To do this, we use the "master theorem" of Boneh, Boyen, and Goh [4, Theorem A.5] .
In a group of prime order, we represent each randomly chosen group element g as a random variable X, which indicates the exponent of g relative to some fixed group generator g 0 (represented by 1). Interdependencies of group elements are made explicit by reusing the same variables; for example, a generic Diffie-Hellman tuple can be represented by the expression (1, X, Y, XY ) in the variables X and Y . The key concept we will use is dependence of variables, which we now define.
We say that f · S is dependent on (P, Q, R) if there exist integers a i,j for 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ s, integers b k for 1 ≤ k ≤ t, and integers c l with 1 ≤ l ≤ m, such that
is nonzero in Z[X 1 , . . . , X n , Y ] but becomes zero when we set Y = f . We say that f · S is independent of (P, Q, R) if f · S is not dependent on (P, Q, R). We say that f is independent of (P, Q, R) if f · {1} is independent of (P, Q, R).
In the definition, the polynomials u i represent elements of G 1 , polynomials v j represent elements of G 2 , and polynomials w k represent elements of G t , while the polynomial f represents the challenge element in the assumption. Our definition generalizes that of Boneh et al. by allowing the challenge element to be in any of the three groups; the polynomials χ represent the elements with which the challenge element can be paired.
We note that Boneh et al. use polynomials over F p to represent group elements; however, this choice does not take into account the fact that in our assumptions the relations between the variables remain the same while the group order p may vary. Thus we define our variables in terms of polynomials over Z and observe that if independence holds over Z then it holds over F p for all sufficiently large p.
Definition D.2. Let P be a prime-order bilinear group generator, and let P, Q, R, f be as in Definition D.1. Define the following distribution:
, . . . , g ur( x) , h v 1 ( x) , . . . , h vs( x) , g
, . . . , g
We define the advantage of algorithm A that outputs b ∈ {0, 1} in solving the (P, Q, R, f )-decision Diffie-Hellman problem in G 1 to be We define the analogous problem G t by taking T 0 ← g
The Boneh-Boyen-Goh "master theorem" is as follows. Boneh et al. prove the theorem for the (P, Q, R, f )-DDH problem in G t . The same argument carries over to the statement in G 1 , using our generalized definition of independence.
Theorem D.3 ([4, Theorem A.5]). Let P, Q, R be as in Definition D.1, let f ∈ Z[X 1 , . . . , X n ], and let p be a prime. Let d = 2 · max{deg α : α ∈ P ∪ Q ∪ R ∪ {f }}. If f is independent of (P, Q, R), then any algorithm that solves the (P, Q, R, f )-DDH problem in G t with advantage 1/2 in a generic bilinear group of order p must take time at least Ω( p/d − n), asymptotically as p → ∞.
If f · Q is independent of (P, Q, R), then the same statement holds for the (P, Q, R, f )-DDH problem in G 1 .
We now apply this theorem to Assumptions 3 and 4. The assumptions are too complex for us to check the independence conditions by hand, so we turn to a computer. To do this, we first note that the independence condition of Definition D.1 is equivalent to the two Z-modules Z[{u i v j }, {w k }, {χ Y }] and Z[{u i v j }, {w k }, {χ f }] having the same rank. Thus we can determine independence by the following procedure:
5. Compute rank(M 1 ) and rank (M 2 ). If they are equal, then f · S is independent of (P, Q, R); otherwise there is a dependence.
We begin with Assumption 4 since it fits exactly into this framework. If we use 1, A, B to represent g 1 , g 2 , g 3 and 1, E, F to represent h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , then we are working in the polynomial ring  Z[x, y, z, u, v, w, a, s, γ, c 1 , c 2 , A, B , E, F ] in 15 variables over Z. We set P = 1, x, u, A, Ay, Av, B, Bz, Bw, a, xa, ua, s, xs, us, as + Ac 1 , xas + Ayc 1 , uas + Avc 1 , Q = zv − yw, w − v, y − z, E(zu − xw), E(w − u), E(z − x), F (yu − xv), F (v − u), F (x − y), (zv − yw)γ + E(zu − xw)c 2 , (w − v)γ + E(w − u)c 2 , (y − z)γ + E(z − x)c 2 , R = ((xw − xv + yu − yw − zu + zv)aγ), f = (xw − xv + yu − yw − zu + zv)aγs
We use Magma [9] to apply the above procedure with S = {1}. The space V has dimension 565 over Z, and the matrices M 1 and M 2 each have 218 rows (corresponding to polynomials). We find that the ranks of M 1 and M 2 are both 207, so f is independent of (P, Q, R). Thus we have proven the following. On the other hand, Assumption 3 does not quite fit into the framework. First of all, in Assumption 3 the "variable" part of the challenge (i.e., T 0 or T 1 ) consists of three group elements, whereas Theorem D.3 allows only one element to vary. In addition, both T 0 and T 1 have a specified form, whereas in Theorem D.3 one of these elements should be uniformly random. However, a simple hybrid argument shows that Assumption 3 follows from a number of related assumptions that do fit the model of Theorem D.3. Specifically, we define new variables T 0i , T 1i for i = 1, 2, 3, such that T 0 = (T 01 , T 02 , T 03 ) and T 1 = (T 11 , T 12 , T 13 ). We then have where in each case we choose R R ← G 1 . Each of the terms (D.2)-(D.7) on the right hand side corresponds to an assumption that can be modeled in the generic group framework. If all six of the terms are negligible, then G satisfies Assumption 3. We note that the term (D.3) is equal to zero since T 11 is chosen randomly and independently of Z ∪{T 02 , T 03 }. To address the other five terms, we set the variables in the generic group framework as follows. If we again use 1, A, B to represent g 1 , g 2 , g 3 and 1, E, F to represent h 1 , h 2 , h 3 , then we are working in the polynomial ring Z[x, y, z, u, v, w, a, b, s, c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , d 1 , d 2 , d 3 , A We construct the matrices M 1 and M 2 for each of the five assumptions corresponding to equations (D.2),(D.4)-(D.7) and determine their ranks. The set P and the polynomial f depend on the equation we are considering; in each case we use Q as above and set S = Q. The results are summarized in Table 3 . Since the ranks of M 1 and M 2 are equal in each case, the required independence holds, and we have proven the following.
Proposition D.5. Any algorithm that breaks Assumption 3 with advantage 1/2 in a generic bilinear group of order p must take time at least Ω( √ p), asymptotically as p → ∞ Finally, we consider the 3-party Diffie-Hellman assumption in prime-order groups (Definition 6.4). This assumption is simple enough that we can do the necessary computations by hand. We work in the polynomial ring Z[a, b, c], and define P = Q = (1, a, b, c) , R = ∅, f = abc.
Suppose f · Q is dependent on (P, Q, R). Then there is a nonzero expression of the form (D.1) that is equal to zero when we set Y = f . Thus we can write Since each term on the left hand side has degree at most 2 and each term on the right hand side has degree at least 3, the sums on each side must both be equal to zero. Furthermore, since the four elements of Q are linearly independent over Z, the coefficients c χ must all be zero. But then when we replace f with Y we get an expression that is also zero, a contradiction. Thus f · Q is independent of (P, Q, R), and we have proven the following. Proposition D.6. Any algorithm that breaks the 3-party decision Diffie-Hellman assumption with advantage 1/2 in a generic bilinear group of order p must take time at least Ω( √ p), asymptotically as p → ∞
